MODELLING LOCATION REVEAL ATTACKS IN MOBILE SYSTEMS by Zömbik, László & Buttyán, Levente
PERIODICA POLYTECHNICA SER. EL. ENG. VOL. 48, NO. 1–2, PP. 85–100 (2004)
MODELLING LOCATION REVEAL ATTACKS IN MOBILE
SYSTEMS
László ZÖMBIK  and Levente BUTTYÁN  
 Ericsson Hungary, Budapest
Department of Telecommunication and Mediainformatics
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
e-mail: laszlo.zombik@ericsson.com
  Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS)
Department of Telecommunications
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
e-mail: buttyan@crysys.hu
Received: Dec. 3, 2003
Abstract
We propose a novel approach for the modelling and discovery of location reveal attacks in mobile
environments. Our approach is based on the theory of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP).
We demonstrate the power of our approach by analysing the MIPv4 protocol and by showing that it
does not protect the location information of the mobile node appropriately.
In order to solve this problem we specify which communications should be encrypted within
MIPv4. The so specified protocols were verified using our CSP-based model, and they were found
secure.
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1. Introduction
Using the Internet more widely for exchanging information, security requirements
have also gained importance. Users nowadays would not only like to communi-
cate, but they also would like to do it securely. Therefore, certain information is
not intended to be available or disclosed to unauthorized entities. Furthermore,
communicating peers have to be identified unambiguously. Besides, it must be en-
sured that information has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized
or accidental manner.
With the deployment of IPmobility protocols [4, 5, 6], the binding of the iden-
tity to the location of the nodes has disappeared. This makes it possible to achieve
an additional security service: the protection of location of the users. Location
hiding has already settled in mobility systems, like GSM, UMTS or GPRS.
In an IP environment, where an honest communication should take place
through hostile networks, keeping the location of the nodes unrevealed is not an
easy task. An eavesdropper can listen anywhere in the network, or several of them
can join and they even can monitor the entire honest communication.
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On the one hand, this means that the attacker should not be able to find
location-related information by analysing the content of IP packets. On the other
hand, he should also be unable to deduce location-related information by statistical
analysis of the network [7].
In this paper, we focus on the formal requirement and we give a procedure
based on a formal verification technique to validate whether an attacker, which
eavesdrops at several points in the network, is capable to identify the location of
honest nodes.
Several formal methods exist that can be used to verify the security properties
of a system [9, 10, 12, 11]. In this paper we use a CSP-based approach. CSP has
already been used to verify secrecy and authenticity properties of key exchange
protocols [1] as well as to analyse fair exchange protocols [13]. However, to the
best of our knowledge it has never been used to verify properties related to location
hiding in a mobile system. As for the mobile system we demonstrate our approach
on the Mobile IPv4 protocols, but we note that with slight modifications, it can be
applied to any mobility protocol such as MIPv6, GPRS, UMTS, etc.
The outline of the paper is the following: In Section 2 a short introduction
to the CSP language is presented. In Section 3 the operation of the Mobile IPv4
protocol is briefly summarized. Section 4 is concerned with the general CSPmodel
of a mobile IP system. Finally in Section 5, the location-hiding criteria and their
formal verification in a Mobile IPv4 system are discussed.
2. Introduction to CSP
Concurrent systems, in which components can interact with each other, can be
described and analysed using the CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [3]
language.
In CSP, system components called processes communicate by events. Events
consist of atomic structures. A typical event is denoted by c i  j m, which states
that on communication channel c, i has sent message m to j . The related process
behaviour can be described by the constructs c m  P and c?a  T  Pa. The
former means that the process initially sends out message m on channel c, and then
it behaves as process P . The latter describes that the process waits for input a  T
on channel c and once it received it, behaves like Pa. STOP and SKIP are the
most trivial processes, the former produces no traces, while the latter expresses that
a process successfully terminated.
A process can be combined via various operators to obtain new processes.
Q  PR means that Q can behave as either P or R. PAR means that P and R
can work in parallel, however they have to synchronize on any event a  A. Thus,
they may have to wait for each other, and they must perform the event jointly. P
and R  R) if there is no event the two processes interact. The hiding operator
PR or Pa 	 a   (where  is the set of all possible events) means that the
corresponding process behaves as P , except that properties of R are missing, or
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events of a do not exist.
The renaming operator applies a mapping  to change an action into another.
Thus, P behaves like P , except that all visible events a from P are relabelled
by whatever  associates with a. E.g., Pabmeans that event a of process P are
renamed to event b.
The guarded alternative b&P only allows a process to behave like P if the
Boolean expression b is true, otherwise the process becomes STOP (i.e, b&P  P
if b else STOP).
Let traces P be the set of finite sequences (
ai ) of events that a process P
possibly generates. The traces refinement T is defined between two processes in
such a way that traces R  traces P  P T R.
3. IP Mobility
There are several protocols and systems, which can provide transparent connectivity
to the Internet while the mobility of nodes is also ensured. The GPRS and UMTS
systems offer mobility via their radio networks. Protocols in the lower layers handle
the mobility issues, and the upper layer protocols grant IP communication.
There are IP-based micro-mobility protocols that handle the mobility of a
small area efficiently. The IP macro-mobility protocols are used to handle global
movements, and they do not necessarily use radio medium to achieve mobility.
The Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 protocols can be used for handling IP
mobility without the need of any support from the lower layers (e.g. radio network).
They consist of two phases: the registration and the data communication
phase. In the registration phase, the mobile informs its partners about its location
change. After this, the data communication phase can be initiated. If the data
communication is optimized, then triangle routing (v4) or route optimization (v6)
is used. Otherwise, reverse tunnelling (v4) or return routability (v6) is employed.
Nowadays, the MIPv4 is used most commonly, therefore, our work is focused
on this protocol.
3.1. The Mobile IPv4 Protocol
AMIPv4 system [4] consists of the Home Agent (HA) and the Foreign Agent (FA),
which handle the mobility issues, a Mobile Node (MN), which moves from one
location to another and a Correspondent Node (CN), which the MN communicates.
At the beginning, the MN registers with the new attachment point. If the FA
is involved in the registration, then the MN sends a Registration Request (RReq) to
the FA, including MN-HA, and MN-FA Authentication extensions (MNHAAuth1,
MNFAAuth1), if they exists. The FA processes the request, it may attach an FA-
HA Authentication extension (FAHAAuth1) and forwards it to the home network.
The HA answers with a Registration Reply (RRep), which grants or denies the
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Request, including MN-HA and FA-HA authentication extensions (MNHAAuth2,
FAHAAuth2). The FA processes the Registration Reply and then relays it (it may
attach an MN-FA authentication extensions, MNFAAuth2) to the MN to inform it
about the disposition of its Request. In a simplified model of MIPv4, messages
contain the source and destination IP addresses, the HA and the home IP addresses
(MNIP) of the MN. The registration phase has two variants depending on whether
the FA is involved or not. If the FA is involved, then the protocol is the following:
I.1. MN  FA: RReq: MNIP, FAIP, HAIP, MNHAAuth1, MNFAAuth1
I.2. FA   HA: RReq: FAIP, HAIP, MNIP, MNHAAuth1, MNFAAuth1
I.3. HA   FA: RRep: HAIP, FAIP, Result, MNIP, MNHAAuth2, FAHAAuth2
I.4. FA  MN: RRep: FAIP, MNIP, Result, HAIP, MNIP, MNHAAuth2, FAHAAuth2
If the FA is not involved in the registration, then the protocol has the following
steps:
II.1. MN  HA: RReq: CCoA, HAIP, MNIP, MNHAAuth1
II.2. HA   MN: RRep: HAIP, CCoA, Result, MINP, MNHAAuth2
where CCoA is the co-located care of address, which is the temporary IP address
that the mobile receives in the foreign network.
In the data communication phase, the IP packets travel in triangle betweenCN,
HA and MN. However, if firewalls and ingress filtering are used, reverse tunnelling
is used instead of triangle routing.
Both triangle routing and reverse tunnelling follow different procedures de-
pending on whether the co-located or the Foreign Agent care of address is used.
Hence, there are four different cases:
Triangle routing with co-located care of address
The communication when triangle routing is used consists of three steps. If the
CN intends to communicate with the MN, then it addresses the MN by its home IP
address. If the MN is away from the home network (the registration phase has been
executed), then the HA grabs the message, encapsulates it, and sends it to the MN
by using its co-located care of address. When the MN receives it, decapsulates the
message. If the MN wants to send a message, then it directly addresses the CN.
III.1. CN   HA: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
III.2. HA   MN: Data: HAIP, CCoA, CNIP, MNIP, msg1
III.3. MN  CN: Data: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
Reverse Tunnelling with co-located care of address
In reverse tunnelling, the MN does not address the CN, however, it uses the tunnel
(encapsulates the messages) to the HA.
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IV.1. CN   HA: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
IV.2. HA   MN: Data: HAIP, CCoA, CNIP, MNIP, msg1
IV.3. MN  HA: Data: CCoA, HAIP, MNIP, CNIP, msg2
IV.4. HA   CN: Data: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
Triangle routing with FA care of address
In this situation the FA is installed between the MN and the HA, in such a way that
the FA becomes the endpoint of the tunnel.
Triangle routing is modified, compared to the co-located care of address:
V.1. CN   HA: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.2. HA   FA: Data: HAIP, FAIP, CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.3. FA   MN: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.4. MN  CN: Data: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
Reverse Tunnelling with FA care of address
The difference in reverse tunnelling compared to the reverse tunneling of co-located
care of address is the following. The HA does not send any message directly to the
MN, however, it encapsulates and sends them to the FA. The FA decapsulates, then
forwards the message to MN.Messages from the MN use the same communication
path.
VI.1. CN   HA: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
VI.2. HA   FA: Data: HAIP, FAIP, CNIP, MNIP, msg1
VI.3. FA   MN: Data: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
VI.4. MN  FA: Data: MNIP, FAIP, CNIP, MNIP, msg2
VI.5. FA   HA: Data: FAIP, HAIP, CNIP, MNIP, msg2
VI.6. HA   CN: Data: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
4. General CSP Model of a Mobile IP
The general CSP model of a mobile IP system for formal verification of security
properties can be divided into the specification part and the system description part
(Fig. 1). In the specification part, the expected operation of the system is formalized,
while the system description part models the operation of the actual system. If these
two blocks behave equivalently, then the system conforms to its specification. This
can be verified by analysing their traces. If the mobile system behaves properly,
then the system is trace refined to its specification. Thus: specification T system.
The next subsection covers the general model of the mobile system, and
Subsection 4.2 is concerned with the secret specification. In Section 5.1 we show
how the secret specification is used in the specification of location-hiding.
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4.1. The Mobile System
In the CSP-model of the MIPv4 system, each component (also called node) corre-
sponds to the protocol participant (i.e. FA, HA, CN, MN). In addition, a special
system component represents the attacker. These components communicate with
each other via channels. In our model, each component has a send and a receive
channel. The honest nodes use the send channel to send messages and the receive
channel to receive messages. The attacker has the ability to inject, delete and mod-
ify messages sent by the honest participants. We model this ability of the attacker
by allowing the attacker node in the model to access the send and receive channels
of the honest nodes. More precisely, in our model, the attacker receives messages
on the send channels and sends messages on the receive channels (see Fig. 1). This
corresponds to the well-known DOLEV–YAO model [1].
In addition to the send and receive channels, we introduce some special chan-
nels for technical reasons. These are the leak and the ClaimSecret channels. The
leak channel is used by the attacker to signal that a secret or other useful information
is obtained. In this case the message contains information about the location-related
facts, from which the attacker has learnt the position of the MN. These facts can be
secrets, or they can be information about identification or location of the MN. The
ClaimSecret channel is used to express that a data-element is a secret of a node, and
it should not be obtained by the attacker:
channel send: ALL_NODE.ALL_NODE.MSG
channel receive: ALL_NODE.ALL_NODE.MSG
channel leak: Attacker.Env.MSG
channel ClaimSecret: ALL_NODE.Env.SECRET
where Attacker and Env are the processes of the attacker and the environment,
respectively. The environment is a special process to which the attacker sends
its leak signals. ALL_NODE means the set of nodes (including the Attacker) and
SECRET is the information which is obtained or should be obtained by the attacker.
Messages sent on channels are built from atomic components, according to
the following scheme:
MSG  ATOMKEY(MSG)MSG.MSG 
Key  
Atom  IPADDRESSESKEYmsg1msg2MNFAAuth1
MNFAAuth2MNHAAuth1MNHAAuth2garbage
IPADDRESSES  CNIPMNIPFAIPHAIPCCoA
The behaviour of the MN is the following. First, it tries to register by sending
its registration request. According to the reply, either a new request is initiated or
the MN checks the validity of the authentication extension. If the authentication
is correct, the MN is capable to send and receive data, otherwise tries to register
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again. Once registered, the MN sends data according to triangle routing or reverse
tunneling. In our model, the above described behaviour of the MN, when triangle
routing is used, is encoded as follows:
MN_INIT  send!MNFA.RReq 
FAALL_NODEreceive? FA.M.N.RRep 
(Result == accepted) (MNHAAuth is correct)& MN_DATAMN_INIT
MN_DATA 
send!MN.CN.msg2  MN_DATA
FAALL_NODEFA.M.N.msg1  MN_DATA
The behaviour of the other honest nodes is similar. The behaviour of the attacker,
however, is very much different from the behaviour of the honest nodes.
The attacker can listen into the communication of the honest nodes. Based
on the eavesdropped information, he can deduce new knowledge and build new or
altered messages and try to mislead honest nodes. The main goal of the attacker is
to obtain secrets or location-related informations in the communication.
The full description of the attacker is beyond of scope of this paper, however,
the interested reader is referred to [1].
The attacker has a certain initial knowledge (S0 ). He eavesdrops newmessages
and deduces new knowledge (S1). Thus, the actual knowledge of the attacker is:
S  S0  S1.
The deduction operator    is defined as: Let be  the set of facts, from
which a new set of fact  can be deduced. If the attacker knows , then he can
expand his new actual knowledge S with , so:   S  S  S  .
The deduction rules are the following:
m  S  S  m
S  m  S  S   S   m
k  KEYm  MSG km  km
k  KEY km  MSG k km  m 	 m  MSG
k1  KEY km  MSG k  k1  k1 km  garbage
a  ATOM  SECRET    a
The honest part of the Mobile IPv4 system (SYSTEM_HONEST) consists of the
CN, HA, FA, and MN, and they work independently:
SYSTEM_HONEST MN  FA  HA  CN 
The full system contains the attacker too:
SYSTEM  SYSTEM_HONESTsend  receiveATTACKER
Note that, according to the Dolev-Yao model, the attacker has access to all com-
munications, thus, MN, CN, HA, FA do not communicate with each other directly,
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Fig. 1. Trace refinement of the mobile system against its security specifications
but only via the attacker. In our model this is expressed by the honest part of the
system, is set to work parallel with the attacker in such a way that they synchronize
events on the send and receive channels.
4.2. Secrecy Requirements
We want to use our model defined above to verify whether or not protocol-related
information carried by the protocol messages remain secret (unknown) to the at-
tacker. Therefore we need to define formally what wemean by a data element being
secret to the attacker.
In our model we consider a data element secret if it is claimed to be secret, and
the attacker can not leak it in his leak channel. Thus, if a ClaimSecret!a Env 	 		 
SECRET a  HONEST message is sent by the honest nodes, then the attacker
must not send a leak.Attacker.Env 	 		  SECRET message.
This can be expressed as a trace specification:
SECRET_SPECa b	 
 
SECRETClaimSecret!a.Env.	  trace	a  HONEST
leak.Attacker.Env 	  trace
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Thus the task is to compare whether the traces of SYSTEMrefine to its specification
SECRET_SPEC.
However, the complex process SYSTEMdoes not have ClaimSecret channel.
In the ClaimSecret channel a signal has to be sent before the first message is to be
emitted.
This means that ClaimSecret!a.Env 	 message either can be added to each
node as the initial message, or the first message of each node in SYSTEM can be
renamed to it. We utilize the advantage of the renaming operator, thus the model
of the mobile protocols remain undistorted.
Since only the leak and ClaimSecret events are important to the refinement,
the unimportant events are hidden:
SYSTEM_S
 SYSTEMfirst messageaClaimSecret!a.Env 	SECRET	a  HONEST
(Eventsleak ClaimSecret 
The mobile system is secure if:
SECRET_SPEC	  SECRET T SYSTEM_S 
5. Location Hiding
The definition of location privacy relies on the fact that some information is bounded
to the location of the user (e.g. in cellular systems the network ID, area, cell ID car-
ries this information). Some information identifies the mobile node unambiguously
(e.g. in cellular networks, the IMSI number).
A trivial solution to keep the location of the MN hidden is that either location
information or identification information of the communication is kept secret.
If the above information are well-known to the attacker, but only the logical
binding between the location and identification information is unknown, then the
location of the target still cannot be determined.
More specifically, in the first case, the attacker identifies that the MN partici-
pates in the communication, however, he cannot localize theMN. For example if the
attacker eavesdrops an IP packet of communication between the CN and HA,which
contains the home IP address of the mobile, then the attacker can only state that the
mobile has been participated in the communication, but none of the endpoints are
the MN.
In the second case, the attacker identifies a node, which is the originator
or destination of a communication, however he cannot identify as his target, the
MN. Since in the Internet there are plenty nodes communicating with each other,
therefore, when the attacker eavesdrops a communication and localize its endpoints,
he can not state that the endpoint of this communication is the MN.
In the third case, the attacker is only capable to find out the location, if he
realises the fact that the MN was participated in the communication, and he must
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obtain another fact which is related to the position. Furthermore he has to prove
the binding, so he has to prove that the position information belongs to the MN. For
example consider the following case. The attacker has eavesdropped a message,
whose destination is the CN, and the originator is an unknown node, (so not the
HA) and its location is determined. Furthermore the message contains the home
IP address of a Mobile node as a source. In addition the attacker knows somehow
that the MN uses triangle routing with co-located care of address. In this case the
attacker knows that theMN is involved in the communication, he knows the location
of the unknown node. Furthermore he knows that the unknown node is not the HA,
so in case of triangle routing with co-located care of address it must be the MN.
In our approach we supposed that the identification information of the MN is
the MNIP.
We further supposed that there are three ways to determine the location in-
formation of the MN. In the first case the position information of any node can be
determined if the node emitted or received a packet, and the attacker had heard it.
In the second case the foreign agent care of address and in the third case the co-
located care of address determine the position information of theMN. The reason is
that the messages are routed towards the mobile using those addresses. In addition,
in case of reverse routing the MN uses those addresses to send messages. However
this not necessarily means the location of the MN is revealed, if the attacker is
unable to eavesdrop the MNIP, then the identified communication may belong to
other mobiles, which are served by the same HA.
In the above, the attacker cannot prove the logical binding. Assuming the
location and identification information above, there are three bindings. The first
one is, when a mobile sends or receives a message which contains the MNIP, while
the second binding is when the attacker eavesdroped somewhere a message which
contained both the the MNIP and FAIP, and the third logical binding is that the
MNIP and the CCoA is found in the same message.
Summary of the cases in which the location remains protected, is the follow-
ing. Either the MNIP should be kept secret or the CCoA and FAIP are kept secret,
and the attacker also does not communicate with the MN. If the above statements
cannot be assumed, then the location of the MN is unrevealed if the following two
statements are valid. The attacker is unable to find a message in which either the
MNIP and the FAIP; or the MNIP and CCoA message elements are included. The
attacker is unable to find any message which is sent from or to the MN and in which
the MNIP is included.
5.1. Location Reveal Attacks on Mobile IPv4 Protocol Using CSP
Our CSP-based model is only capable to find location-related attacks, in which the
attacker analyses the content of the IP packets, and further knows the originator and
the destination of the message.
If we want to verify whether the location is protected, let us consider first the
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trivial case. The user location is protected, if the identification information remains
secret. Thus the MNIP remains secret: SECRET_SPEC(MNIP) T SYSTEM_S.
Unfortunately, this is not true, the attacker can receive the MNIP.
However, if the attacker does not receive any single message from the MN
and he is not able to collect care of addresses, then the location of the MN still
remains unrevealed:
(SECRET_SPEC(FAIP) T SYSTEM_S)
(SECRET_SPEC(CCoA) T SYSTEM_S)
(send!MN.a.msg 	 traces(SYSTEM_HONEST) a
 HONEST,msg  MSG
(receive?a.MN.msg 	 traces(SYSTEM_HONEST) a
 HONEST,msg  MSG 
Unfortunately, in MIPv4 the FAIP, CCoA are sent unprotected, and also the MN
sent a message, which the attacker eavesdropped. Therefore the above cases do not
result in a hidden location of the MN.
When the MNIP, CCoA and FAIP can be obtained by the attacker, and even
theMNcommunicates directly to him, there is only one case, when theMN location
remains unknown. According to our attacker model, this case is, when the attacker
is not able to find any message originated from MN and containing MNIP, and
besides, he is unable to find a message where the MNIP and the care of address of
the MN appears.
The former condition is equal to:
(send!MN.a.msg 	 a  ALL_NODE,MNIP  msg)
 trace(SYSTEM_HONEST)
(receive?a.MN.msg 	 a  ALL_NODE,MNIP  msg)
 trace(SYSTEM_HONEST)
and the latter corresponds to:
send!a.b.msg 	 a b  HONEST,MNIP  msg (FAIP  msg  CCoA  msg)
 trace(SYSTEM_HONEST)
Thus we modified the attacker model, using the guarded alternative. When the
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above rules are violated, the attacker sends a leak signal:
a msg send?MN.a.msg 	 a  ALL_NODE,MNIP  msg &
leak.Attacker.Env.(MN,MNIP)
a msg receive!MN.a.msg 	 a  ALL_NODE,MNIP  msg &
leak.Attacker.Env.(MN,MNIP)
a b msg send?a.b.msg 	 a b  HONEST;MNIP,FAIP  msg &
leak.Attacker.Env.(MNIP,FAIP)
a b msgsend?a.b.msg 	 a b  HONEST; MNIP,CCoA  msg &
leak.Attacker.Env.(MNIP,CCoA)
Specification of the secure system where the attacker is unable to find any logical
bindings between A and B:
SPEC_NOBINDA B  leak.Attacker.Env.A B 
The system should be trace refined as:
SPEC_NOBIND(MN,MNIP)T SYSTEM
SPEC_NOBIND(MNIP,FAIP)T SYSTEM
SPEC_NOBIND(MNIP,CCoA)T SYSTEM 
5.2. Hiding the Communication of Foreign Networks
In the Dolev–Yao model, an attacker has access to the communication channels
of the honest users everywhere. Thus, the location-related information, which is
usually in cleartext in the local network, is easily obtained. We foundwith ourmodel
checker that the MNIP and the care of addresses were obtained by the attacker in
the foreign network.
Besides, it is unlikely that the attacker has access to all foreign networks.
Therefore, in our next approach, communication between the foreign network and
the MNmust be hidden from the attacker. This can be achieved by using the hiding
operator.
Let R be the neighbour of user (the target, the location of which must be
protected) U , and let Xi be an honest node such Xi  RU . Then the system
becomes:
SYSTEM_HONEST
 i Xi  RsendUR receiveUR sendRU  receiveRU U
 send.U R receive.U R send.R U receive.R U
These modifications are applied to the analysis of MIPv4 as follows.
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In the co-located care of address case the system contains no FA, therefore,
let the border router to the MN be R. The mobile system is drawn in Fig. 2:
SYSTEM  CN  H A  SYSTEM_0send receiveATTACKER
where
SYSTEM_0 
 
R
sendMNR sendRMN receiveMNR receiveRMN MN

send MN  R send R MN receive MN  R receive.R MN
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Fig. 2. Outline of a MobileIPv4 system.
The system is described in a similar way when FA care of address is used. The only
difference is that in that case R  FA.
With this model, attacks are found in the registration phase, since all messages
between HA and FA are sent unprotected and CCoA or FAIP and MNIP message
elements are revealed. For the same reasons, this happens when reverse tunnelling
is used. Furthermore, at triangle routing, the mobile sent a message toward the CN
and it contained the MNIP.
Note that the hiding operator can be replaced by renaming operator. In this
case, the messages which are required to be protected, are renamed as they became
meaningless for the attacker.
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5.3. Using Encrypted Channels
From the previous section, it is obvious that the location privacy in MIPv4 can-
not be achieved without encrypting the communication of the user. Encryption is
supported by IPSec [8] protocol.
Therefore let kFA HA and kMN HA be the encryption keys of the tunnelled
communication, when FA and CCoA are used, respectively.
Using FA care of address, the registration phase does not leak the location of
the MN:
I.1. MN  FA: MNIP, FAIP, HAIP, MNHAAuth1, MNFAAuth1
I.2. FA   HA: FAIP, HAIP, kFA HA (MNIP, MNHAAuth1, FAHAAuth1)
I.3. HA   FA: HAIP, FAIP, kFA HA (Result, MNIP, MNHAAuth2, FAHAAuth2)
I.4. FA  MN: FAIP, MNIP, Result, HAIP, MNHAAuth2, MNFAAuth2
Using Foreign Agent care of address, the data transfer phase, if reverse tun-
nelling is used, also keeps the location of the user secret:
VI.1. CN   HA: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
VI.2. HA   FA: HAIP, FAIP, kFA HA (CNIP, MNIP, msg1)
VI.3. FA  MN: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
VI.4. MN  FA: MNIP, FAIP, CNIP, MNIP, msg2
VI.5. FA   HA: FAIP, HAIP, kFA HA(CNIP, MNIP, msg2)
VI.6. HA   CN: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
Using Foreign Agent care of address, in the data transfer phase if triangle
routing is used, unfortunately it reveals the location-related information, since the
MN sends a message that contains MNIP to CN unprotected.
V.1. CN   HA: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.2. HA   FA: HAIP, FAIP, kFA HA (CNIP, MNIP, msg1)
V.3. FA  MN: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.4. MN  CN: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
The same weakness has been found, when co-located care of address was
used. Thus, the registration phase in reverse tunnelling keeps the location secret,
however, triangle routing leaks it.
Therefore the next step is to protect the data traffic between the MN and the
CN. IPSec can be used between them, with key kMN CN:
V.1. CN   HA: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.2. HA   FA: HAIP, FAIP, kFA HA (CNIP, MNIP, msg1)
V.3. FA  MN: CNIP, MNIP, msg1
V.4. MN  CN: MNIP, CNIP, kMN CN (msg2)
Unfortunately, in step V.4. the MN is the originator of the message, and the
MNIP data field is also contained. This means that this encryption still provides no
protection.
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Therefore, when triangle routing is used, our proposal is to build an IPSec
tunnel between either the FA or the border router (R) of the foreign network and
CN, using keys kFA CN or kR CN. (Note that instead of security gateways network
address translator can also be used.)
In this case all traffic from MN to CN can traverse securely.
If the FA is the security gateway, then step V.4 is changed as:
V.4a. MN  FA: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
V.4b. FA   CN: FAIP, CNIP, kFA CN (MNIP, CNIP, msg2)
and if a border router is the security gateway:
V.4a. MN  R: MNIP, CNIP, msg2
V.4b. R   CN: R, CNIP, kR CN (MNIP, CNIP, msg2)
6. Conclusion
Hiding the location of nodes is a new security requirement that gains importance
in mobile environments, especially in IP based mobile communication. In this
paper we presented a formal approach based on CSP to verify protocols against
this new security requirement. The essence of our model is to represent protocol
participants as CSP processes that communicate over various channels. In addition
to the honest participants, the attacker is represented as a CSP process too. In our
attacker model, he can listen to all communication of the protocol participants,
and modify any messages they exchange. The goal of the attacker is to obtain
information, principally data element that reveals the location of the mobile node.
The attacker is not allowed to perform statistical analysis of observed data and to
try to deduce the location of the mobile node in this manner.
We demonstrated the power of our approach by analysing theMIPv4 protocol.
We have shown that the protocol does not protect the location information of the
mobile node properly, hence an attacker can easily learn where themobile is located.
We have assumed that the attacker does not search from the foreign networks, since
there are plenty of them, and the attacker does not have the power to listen to all
foreign networks. Based on this assumption, we have presented that if there is
no encryption between the Home Agent and the other endpoint of the tunnel, the
reverse tunnelling provides no protection against location discovery. Furthermore,
triangle routing only provides location privacy, if in addition to the above encrypted
communication, the data traffic between CN and the mobile is tunnelled, via either
a border router or the FA, using encryption. The proposed configuration is verified
correctly in our model checker. To the best of our knowledge no similar study has
ever been performed before in the research community.
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